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Abstract. In order to support the future expansion and integration of Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS), ongoing research efforts have sought to produce find-
ings that inform the minimum display information elements required for accepta-
ble UAS pilot response times and traffic avoidance. Previous simulations have 
revealed performance benefits associated with DAA displays containing predic-
tive information and suggestive maneuver guidance tools in the form of banding. 
The present study investigated the impact of various maneuver guidance display 
configurations on detect-and-avoid (DAA) task performance in a simulated air-
space environment. UAS pilots’ ability to maintain DAA well clear was com-
pared between displays with either the presence or absence of green DAA bands, 
which indicated conflict-free flight regions. Additional display comparisons as-
sessed pilots’ ability to regain DAA well clear with two different guidance 
presentations designed to aid in DAA well clear recovery during critical encoun-
ters. Performance implications and display considerations for future UAS DAA 
systems are discussed. 
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1 Introduction 
Current day applications of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) primarily involve mil-
itary operations in restricted airspace. However, civil and public-use UAS are expected 
to fly alongside manned commercial aircraft unrestricted across other airspace classes 
within the National Airspace System (NAS) in the coming years. Subject matter experts 
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from academia, industry, and government are currently developing minimum opera-
tional performance standards (MOPS) in order to maintain safety of flight with the in-
tegration of UAS in the NAS [1][2]. Currently, federal regulations require manned pi-
lots to “see and avoid” other aircraft to remain “well clear” [3]. Since UAS pilots are 
positioned at a ground control station (GCS) without the ability to visually detect po-
tential threats from inside the cockpit, they will require a “detect and avoid” (DAA) 
system that provides the information necessary to identify a threat and make an appro-
priate maneuver with the command and control interface [4]. The minimum amount of 
information on the DAA display needed to detect conflicts, determine a resolution, and 
avoid losses of well clear safely has been the focus of ongoing research within NASA’s 
UAS integration in the NAS (UAS-NAS) project.  
 Previous research has explored the minimum DAA display requirements necessary 
to perform UAS pilot tasks. Predictive displays that include avoidance zones, color-
coded alerting, intruders’ relative closest-point-of-approach (CPA), and directional 
icons with conflict alerting have been shown to reduce losses of DAA well clear (DWC) 
and minimize the severity of collision hazards when they do occur [5][6]. A survey 
assessing pilots’ visual information preference identified intruder state information, vis-
ual alerts, and DAA maneuver recommendations as important information elements [7].  
Human-in-the-loop simulations have revealed performance benefits with displays 
containing advanced conflict resolution tools integrated into the vehicle control inter-
face on the ground control station (GCS) [8][9][10]. Specifically, suggestive maneuver 
guidance in the form of banding that provided continuous indications of the predicted 
threats (i.e., losses of DWC) at nearby headings and altitudes have yielded the most 
desirable benefits compared to an informative display [11][12]. While DAA banding 
guidance that indicated the predicted threat severity level was accepted as a requirement 
in the Phase 1 MOPS for the DAA system, it was not specified whether it is necessary 
to incorporate green, conflict-free bands that highlight flight regions absent of any pre-
dicted loss of DWC threats. Furthermore, the suggestive maneuver guidance in previ-
ous evaluations informed maneuvers for maintaining well clear with sufficient time, but 
did not always provide guidance to aid in regaining well clear in the more severe cases 
where a near midair collision (NMAC) was imminent. Recovery guidance presented to 
pilots was not directly assessed for its effects, and there were too few losses of DWC 
with the banding displays to make post-hoc statistical comparisons. Therefore, the pre-
sent study utilized a test setup that allowed for a more complete evaluation of the con-
flict-free maneuver guidance bands and various well clear recovery guidance design 
concepts with respect to pilots’ ability to maintain and regain well clear. 
2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
Ten pilots were recruited for participation in the current experiment. Six of ten were 
active duty UAS pilots (Mage = 36 years old), with averages of 1600 hours of manned 
flight experience and 1400 hours of unmanned flight experience. The other four were 
commercial pilots (Mage = 30 years old) with an average of 9000 hours of manned flight 
experience in civil airspace.  
2.2 Simulation Environment 
Ground Control Station. The GCS used for this study was the Vigilant Spirit Control 
Station (VSCS), which was developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) 
[13]. For the purposes of the current study, VSCS provided a Tactical Situation Display 
(TSD) that displayed ownship, mission route, DAA maneuver guidance, and traffic in-
formation over a moving map. The TSD supported an autopilot control interface that 
allowed pilots to change their altitude and heading without manipulating the pre-filed 
flight plan route. Heading holds could be executed via the graphical compass rose in-
terface or keypad inputs to a steering command window. The compass rose interface 
allowed pilots to click-and-drag an arrow shaped heading bug to the desired heading 
rather than manually input numbers. Altitude values could be changed either by manu-
ally typing in desired values or by using two small arrows (“spinners”) that would in-
crease/decrease altitudes by 500 feet (ft.) per mouse click. Pilots uploaded commands 
to the aircraft by clicking the “Send” button located within the steering window. On a 
separate monitor only visible by the researcher, another component of the Vigilant 
Spirit software (‘Vigilant Spirit Simulation’) allowed researchers to manually launch 
the pre-scripted encounters toward the ownship. 
DAA System. The multi-level alerting structure was constructed through the Java Ar-
chitecture for DAA Modeling and Extensibility (JADEM v.5.4.1) [14]. Intruders 
equipped with transponders (i.e., cooperative) were displayed on the TSD at sensor 
ranges of 15 nautical miles (nmi) laterally and ± 5000 ft. vertically, while intruders with 
RADAR-only equipage (i.e., non-cooperative) were detected at a lateral range of 8nmi 
with the same vertical range. Color-coded symbology was applied to all aircraft within 
sensor range to provide pilots with indications of individual threat severity, based on 
whether they were currently predicted to penetrate the spatial and temporal thresholds 
pre-defined for the current study (see Table 1). Direct auditory alerts were presented as 
the threat severity levels of the intruders increased. The intruders’ relative altitude and 
vertical trend were also constantly visible once they were within sensor range. Other 
intruder elements that appeared within the data tag at the onset of a conflict alert in-
cluded call sign (cooperative intruders only), ground speed, absolute altitude, and ver-
tical velocity. 
     The DAA maneuver guidance (‘Omni Bands’), also generated by the JADEM DAA 
system, provided pilots with a form of conflict resolution using dashed lines (‘banding’) 
that predicted whether particular heading or altitude values were predicted to cause loss 
of DWC threats if flown at that time. The horizontal bands probed relative headings 
within 270° around ownship and appeared on the inner range ring of the moving map. 
The vertical bands probed altitudes within ± 2,000 ft. of ownship on the altitude tape to 
the right of the TSD. The maneuver guidance bands were constantly updating to reflect 
the most up-to-date flight state information, as JADEM did not account for ownship or 
intruder intent. The heading and altitude bands were color-coded in correspondence 
with the predicted threat level from the alerting structure. Headings and altitudes with 
yellow bands were predicted to lead to a loss of DWC (as defined in Table 1) with an 
intruder aircraft within 25 to 55 seconds. Red banding indicated that a particular head-
ing or altitude would lead to a loss of DWC within 25 seconds or less. Thus, regions 
with yellow or red banding were to be avoided, as maneuvers toward these areas would 
trigger at least one Corrective DAA or DAA Warning alert, respectively. Safe flight 
regions that would remain well clear with intruders were indicated by either the pres-
ence of green banding or the absence of banding, depending on the condition (see Ex-
perimental Design).  
Table 1.  Multi-Level Alerting Scheme  
Alert Level 
Separation  
Criteria 
Time to  
Loss of 
DWC 
Icon 
Aural Alert  
Verbiage 
DAA Warning 
Alert 
HMD = 0.75 nmi 
ZTHR = 450 ft. 
modTau = 35 sec 
25 sec 
 
“Traffic, Maneuver 
Now,  
Traffic, Maneuver 
Now” 
Corrective 
DAA Alert 
HMD = 0.75 nmi 
ZTHR = 450 ft. 
modTau = 35 sec 
55 sec 
 
“Traffic, Avoid” 
Preventive 
DAA Alert 
HMD = 0.75-1.0 nmi 
ZTHR = 450-700 ft. 
modTau = 35 sec 
N/A 
 
“Traffic, Monitor” 
None (Target) 
Within surveillance 
field of regard 
N/A  N/A 
 
     Once resolution options for remaining well clear were no longer achievable by own-
ship, the bands would fully saturate to red and well clear recovery guidance was pre-
sented on the TSD. Though likely that the well clear boundary had already been pene-
trated in these worst-case scenarios, it was considered necessary to provide pilots with 
some form of maneuver guidance as a last resort to help minimize the severity of the 
separation loss and regain DWC. In order to achieve this, the well clear recovery guid-
ance calculated the direction that would lead to the maximum separation at the CPA. 
The underlying computations used to suggest conflict resolutions were based on the 
Generic Resolution Advisor and Conflict Evaluator (GRACE) algorithm [15], which 
evaluates multiple intruders for threats based on the aforementioned separation stand-
ards. The GRACE maneuver selection logic generated conflict-free solutions with con-
siderations made to current intruder flight states and, in well clear recovery cases, pre-
sented either the lateral or vertical maneuver suggestion with the lowest ‘NMAC cost’.  
     The recovery guidance was displayed to pilots both textually and graphically on the 
TSD. The graphical representation of the maneuver recommendation varied among tri-
als (see Experimental Design). The textual guidance for both recovery displays was 
shown at the top of the TSD inside of a green border, labeled with commands of either 
‘Turn Right’, ‘Turn Left’, ‘Climb’, or ‘Descend’. The recovery guidance text would 
switch to ‘Maintain’ to inform pilots that they may remain at their current heading and 
altitude for the time being once they reached the flight state necessary to maximize their 
separation with the surrounding intruder(s). Once ownship regained well clear with the 
intruder(s) and the bands were no longer saturated red, the recovery guidance as a whole 
was no longer displayed. 
2.3 Experimental Design 
The current experiment utilized a one-way and repeated measures design to examine 
the impact of green DAA bands (With vs. Without) and band saturation display options 
(Limited Suggestive vs. Directional) on pilots’ DAA task performance.  
 
Green DAA Bands. In the previous simulation that introduced Omni Bands [11], green 
banding was used to denote safe flight regions that would not result in a loss of DWC 
if flown at that time. Headings and altitudes that were not probed (i.e., the 90° behind 
ownship, >3,000ft relative altitude) did not have any banding. During the open-ended 
portion of the debriefs, pilots voiced varied opinions on the usefulness of the green 
bands for conflict avoidance, with some stating that they added display clutter in con-
ditions using Omni Bands (albeit quantitative analysis of questionnaire responses with 
regard to display clutter did not reveal statistical significance). The present study sought 
to examine whether the presence (or absence) of green DAA banding had any impact 
on pilot performance and response times; thus, it was added as a between-subjects ma-
nipulation. Half of the pilots saw green DAA bands which differentiated safe regions 
from those that were un-probed or would create conflict (at the Corrective DAA or 
DAA Warning levels), while the others did not have green DAA bands displayed to 
them (Fig. 1). The pilots that did not have use of the green bands saw a blank, defaulted 
(grey) presentation of their inner range ring and altitude tape (similar to when un-
probed) until there was a potential conflict within sensor range that triggered yellow 
and/or red bands on the display. Pilots without green DAA bands were instructed to 
avoid conflicts by flying into regions with no banding present. 
 
(a)   (b)  
Fig. 1. TSD with (a) and without (b) green bands displayed. 
Well Clear Recovery Guidance. The Well Clear Recovery guidance display(s) ap-
peared when a loss of DWC could no longer be avoided. There were two graphical 
representations of guidance presented to pilots for regaining well clear: Limited Sug-
gestive and Directional. The Limited Suggestive recovery guidance displayed the range 
of optimal headings or altitudes to fly in order to maximize separation (Fig. 2). Low 
and high bounds of a recommended altitude or heading range were provided to achieve 
a timely regain of well clear. A green ‘wedge’ encompassing the suggestion range ap-
peared next to ownship and extended out to the range rings when the algorithm recom-
mended a turn; pilots were to comply by flying to headings within the suggestive 
wedge. If the recovery algorithm recommended a vertical maneuver for collision avoid-
ance, pilots were to aim for altitudes within the green wedge that appeared on the alti-
tude tape.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Limited Suggestive Well Clear Recovery Guidance. 
The Directional recovery guidance simply indicated the suggested maneuver type by 
displaying an arrow in the recommended direction of the maneuver (Fig. 3). A green 
arrow appeared pointing to either the left or right of ownship when the recovery guid-
ance was recommending a turn. For vertical maneuver recommendations, an up or 
down arrow appeared to the left of the altitude tape to suggest a climb or descent. Di-
rectional recovery guidance did not specify a specific range of headings or altitudes to 
choose from, instead allowing the pilot to determine the size of the maneuver in the 
recommended direction and sense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 3. Directional Well Clear Recovery Guidance. 
2.4 Procedure 
Training. Pilots began the day by filling out demographics and informed consent 
forms. They were then given a short briefing on the experiment before being trained on 
the basic functionalities within VSCS. Once pilots demonstrated proficiency with the 
vehicle control inputs required to maneuver the simulated aircraft, they were trained on 
the various components of the DAA system (above). Pilots assigned to the display con-
figuration with no green bands for remaining well clear were trained with slides that 
excluded any mention of green bands. Each experimental scenario was preceded by a 
training run that allowed pilots to practice interaction with the upcoming well clear 
recovery display configuration. The banding options for remaining well clear varied 
between subjects, while the recovery display options varied between trials (within sub-
jects).  
 
DAA Pilot Task. Pilots completed four 40-minute scenarios --- two with each well 
clear recovery guidance display. The order of presentation was counterbalanced be-
tween participants. Pilots were instructed to navigate a simulated MQ-9 Reaper along 
a route line while avoiding well clear violations and NMACs with nearby intruders. 
The scenarios consisted of 20 encounters lasting approximately two minutes each. Six-
teen of the 20 encounters were scripted to lose well clear absent any pilot action, with 
eight of them involving conflicts that blundered into ownship and forced an immediate 
well clear violation. Since there were hardly any losses of DWC observed for displays 
utilizing green DAA banding in the previous simulation [11], it was necessary to intro-
duce severe encounters that allowed for the evaluation of pilots’ ability to regain well 
clear with each recovery band display option. Pilots were instructed not to begin editing 
their trajectory until the onset of a DAA alert required them to do so. Once pilots com-
plied with guidance and successfully avoided an aircraft, they were to return to course 
and fly along the route line until their next encounter was triggered. 
2.5 Measures 
Initial Response Time (Initial RT). Initial Response Time refers to the amount of time 
it took for pilots to initiate a navigational edit into the GCS after the onset of a Correc-
tive DAA or DAA Warning alert.  
 
Total Edit Time. Total Edit Time refers to the amount of time it took for pilots to 
complete their final upload into the navigation interface after starting their initial edit. 
 
Total Response Time (Total RT). Total Response Time refers to the full amount of 
time it took for pilots to upload their final resolution after the onset of a Corrective 
DAA or DAA Warning alert.  
 
Loss of DWC (LoDWC) Severity. As of the present study, the overall severity of each 
well clear violation was identified by the DAA Well Clear Penetration Integral 
(DWCPI) metric [16], which combined the amount of time spent within the well clear 
threshold and the minimum geometric separation at CPA into a single measure. The 
greater the DWCPI magnitude for a given encounter, the more severe the loss of DWC 
event was considered. 
3 Results 
3.1 Green DAA Bands 
The response time metrics were analyzed across the two banding displays using a one-
way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), with an alpha level of .05. The analysis included 
the encounter cases that required pilots to remain DWC (i.e., when positive maneuver 
guidance bands were available). The LoDWC severity results for this variable were not 
tested for statistical significance, as there was only one loss of DWC occurrence among 
all nominal encounters with each banding display.  
 
Initial RT. There was a significant main effect of green bands on initial response times, 
F(1, 281) = 13.10, p < .05. Initial RTs were, on average, 1 second (s) quicker with the 
No Green Bands display (M = 5.00s, SE = 0.32s) compared to the Green Bands display 
(M = 6.00s, SE = 0.25s).   
 
Total Edit. There was only a marginal effect of green bands on total edit times, F(1, 
283) = 3.74, p = .054. Pilot completed their edits, on average, 0.86s quicker with the 
Green Bands display (M = 3.87s, SE = 0.26s) compared to the No Green Bands display 
(M = 4.73s, SE = 0.37s). 
 
Total RT. There was no significant effect of green bands found on total response time, 
p > .05. 
3.2 Well Clear Recovery Type 
The response time and separation metrics were analyzed across the two well clear re-
covery displays using a repeated measures ANOVA, with an alpha level of .05. Statis-
tical comparisons were made across encounters that presented well clear recovery guid-
ance to regain well clear, including the critical cases that blundered into ownship. 
 
Initial RT. There was no significant difference in initial response times found between 
the Limited Suggestive (M = 3.98s, SE = 0.59s) and Directional (M = 3.61s, SE = 0.36s) 
display configurations, p > .05. 
Total Edit. There was no significant difference in total edit times found between the 
Limited Suggestive (M = 5.20s, SE = 1.32s) and Directional (M = 5.71s, SE = 1.44s) 
display configurations, p > .05. 
Total RT. There was no significant difference in total response times found between 
the Limited Suggestive (M = 9.17s, SE = 1.25s) and Directional (M = 9.31s, SE = 1.32s) 
display configurations, p > .05. 
LoDWC Severity. While loss of DWC events were, on average, slightly less severe 
with the Limited Suggestive display configuration (M = 0.86, SE = 0.19) compared to 
the Directional display (M = 1.34, SE = 0.32), the difference in DWCPI magnitude was 
nonsignificant, p > .05. 
4 Discussion 
4.1 Conflict-free Bands for Maintaining DAA Well Clear 
The results suggest that DAA guidance in the form of banding is effective at aiding the 
pilot responsibility of remaining well clear, regardless of whether green bands are im-
plemented to highlight the well clear regions. Initial RT was the only response time 
metric that yielded a (significant) difference of over one second between conditions. 
Pilots utilizing the green bands started their initial edits following a DAA Corrective 
alert 1.5s slower on average. There may be slightly less of a processing delay when 
simply monitoring the onset of conflict bands versus detecting continuous changes in 
the color of bands constantly visible on the display. Nonetheless, conflicts were suc-
cessfully avoided at a nearly equal rate across banding displays overall. There was only 
1 LoDWC (<1% of total encounters) with each banding display, and the LoDWC pro-
portion was comparable to previous analyses observing non-blunders at nominal en-
counter ranges sufficient to remain well clear [16]. The Phase 1 DAA MOPS require a 
distinction between the yellow corrective and red warning guidance bands, while the 
implementation of green (or any color) conflict-free maneuver guidance bands are con-
sidered optional [17]. 
4.2 Recovery Guidance for Regaining DAA Well Clear 
Well clear recovery display type failed to significantly impact any of the response time 
or separation variables in the present study. Response times were nearly identical be-
tween recovery displays, as there was a difference of a half-second or less on every 
response time metric. It should be noted that no large response time differences between 
recovery types were expected, as well clear recovery did not appear until the pilot could 
no longer maintain DAA well clear. Once the bands were fully saturated red and the 
threat severity reached the critical Warning level, an immediate maneuver in compli-
ance with the well clear recovery bands was the expected pilot action. While pilots were 
trained to comply with the guidance, it was left to their discretion whether it was 
deemed appropriate. Minimal decision-making was required when pilots made imme-
diate maneuvers in compliance with the guidance as expected. Pilots complied with the 
well clear recovery guidance to regain well clear in 359 of the 365 (98%) LoDWC 
occurrences. Five of the 6 non-compliance cases involved vertical resolution uploads 
being made instead of the recommended turn (possibly in anticipation of a subsequent 
vertical resolution advisory), and one was due to the pilot preferring a turn in the oppo-
site direction. Compliance rates were identical between displays. Subjective ratings 
gathered from post-simulation questionnaires were also nearly equal between the Lim-
ited Suggestive and Directional displays (preferred by 60% and 40% pilots, respec-
tively).  
     Loss of DWC events were slightly less severe when using the Limited Suggestive 
guidance, which presented a specific solution range to pilots at the onset of recovery 
bands. While the precise recommendations slightly decreased the time spent within the 
well clear threshold, differences in LoDWC severity were not significant. The Limited 
Suggestive and Directional well clear recovery guidance displays available in the pre-
sent study reduced LoDWC severity by 78% and 64%, respectively, compared to the 
previous analysis of the DAA system without recovery guidance [16]. The recovery 
displays appear to be equally effective at aiding the pilot task of regaining DAA well 
clear against intruders at critical ranges, and both were referenced as viable guidance 
options for maximizing horizontal and/or vertical miss distance during a loss of DWC 
event in Phase 1 of the DAA MOPS [17]. In conclusion, multiple design concepts are 
acceptable for maintaining and regaining DWC when the guidance corresponds with 
the alerting logic. 
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